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MANUEL KNOLL
How Aristotelian is Martha Nussbaum’s 
«Aristotelian Social Democracy»?
The twentieth century has witnessed an impressive ren-
aissance of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. This is not only 
true for his virtue ethics but for his political philosophy. In 
the last two decades the latter has been successfully revived 
by Martha C. Nussbaum. Advocating an «Aristotelian Social 
Democracy», Nussbaum bases her version of the capabilities 
approach on Aristotle’s political philosophy1. The capabilities 
approach was originally developed in the 1980s by the econo-
mist Amartya Sen to measure and compare the quality of life 
in developing countries2. The approach had a considerable 
political impact as it influenced the yearly Human Develop-
ment Reports of the United Nations3. 
As a consequence of her cooperation with Sen, Nussbaum 
worked on an Aristotelian grounding of the capabilities ap-
proach starting in the late 1980s. Sen appreciated her work4. 
1 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in Liberalism and the 
Good, ed. by R.B. Douglass, G.M. Mara and H.S. Richardson, New York-
London, Routledge, 1990, pp. 203-52. 
2 A. Sen, Equality of What?, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Va-
lues, Vol. I, ed. by St.M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City-Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1980, (again in A. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement, 
Cambridge (MA), Blackwell, 1982, pp. 353-69). Throughout the 80s and 
90s Sen further developed his approach. Cf. A. Sen, Commodities and Ca-
pabilities, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1985; A. Sen, Inequality reexamined, New 
York-Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992.
3 C.N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme. A better 
Way?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 1 f., 12, 243 ff.; 
Health and Development. Toward a Matrix Approach, ed. by A. Boggio and 
A. Gatti, Houndmills-NewYork, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 128 ff.
4 A. Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in The Quality of Life, ed. by 
M.C. Nussbaum and A. Sen, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 30-53: p. 
30. Cf. J.M. Alexander, Capabilities and Social Justice. The Political Philoso-
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However, since the early 1990s, Nussbaum’s appropriation 
and interpretation of Aristotle have been criticized several 
times5. Nevertheless, still in 2011 Nussbaum holds «the po-
litical and ethical thought of Aristotle» to be the «earliest 
and most important Western historical source for the Capa-
bilities Approach»6. In her interpretations of Aristotle’s texts, 
Nussbaum doesn’t connect to the Thomistic or Catholic his-
tory of the reception of his philosophy, but to the tradition 
of «the British representatives of socialist perfectionism such 
as Green and Barker and later David Ross»7.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach begins with a basic 
question: «What are people actually able to do and to be?» 
This question refers to people’s capabilities or to their op-
portunities to choose and to act8. Nussbaum distinguishes be-
tween human «capabilities» like being able to live a full life 
without pain, or to have good health, and human «function-
ings». The development of a capability is the precondition 
for performing the corresponding functions: «A functioning 
is an active realization of one or more capabilities»9. In her 
texts, Nussbaum presents several open-ended lists of human 
phy of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, Aldershot-Burlington, Ashgate, 
2008, pp. 61, 125.
5 J.R. Wallach, Contemporary Aristotelianism, «Political Theory», XX, 
1992, pp. 613-41; R. Mulgan, Was Aristotle an �Aristotelian Social Demo-
crat»?, «Ethics», CXI, 2000, pp. 79-101. Apart from Mulgan’s paper, this 
issue of Ethics contains texts of Louise M. Antony, Richard J. Arneson and 
Hilary Charlesworth, who examine different aspects of Nussbaum’s capa-
bilities approach, and a reply from Nussbaum to all four texts. All texts 
originated in a symposium (M. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Politics, and Human 
Capabilities: A Response to Antony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan, 
«Ethics», CXI, 2000, pp. 102-40). J.-S. Gordon, Aristoteles über Gerech-
tigkeit. Das V. Buch der Nikomachischen Ethik, Freiburg-München, Alber, 
2007, pp. 285-339; M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder demokratische Gerechtig-
keit? Die politische Philosophie des Aristoteles und Martha Nussbaums egali-
taristische Rezeption, München-Paderborn, Fink, 2009.
6 M. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities. The Human Development 
Approach, Cambridge (MA)-London, Belkant Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011, p. 125.
7 Nussbaum states this in her interview with Josef Früchtl and Her-
linde Pauer-Studer Tragische Konflikte und wohlgeordnete Gesellschaft, 
«Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie», XCIV, 1996, pp. 135-47, 140-41 
(transl. by M. Knoll).
8 M. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, cit., pp. X, 20, 123.
9 M. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, cit., pp. 24-25.
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capabilities, which she has modified and extended over the 
years. For her, the development of the listed capabilities is 
necessary for living a good life in the objective sense. The 
capabilities approach attempts to morally oblige the state or 
the government to supply the necessary means to enable citi-
zens to develop their capabilities and to perform the corre-
sponding human functions. If the state or the government is 
able to do this «up to a suitable threshold level», it is (par-
tially, or minimally) just, and promotes «the good of human 
beings»10. 
This paper assesses Nussbaum’s claim that her capabilities 
approach is a genuinely Aristotelian contemporary political 
philosophy. It substantiates the thesis that Aristotle’s ancient 
political philosophy is incompatible with Nussbaum’s Social 
Democracy. The first section analyzes how she bases her ap-
proach on human nature and questions her claim that Aristo-
tle’s account of human nature and her approach are not met-
aphysical. The second section examines the normative dimen-
sion of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and shows how she 
adopts and modifies Aristotle’s doctrine of distributive justice 
in an egalitarian way. The section argues that Nussbaum’s 
egalitarian interpretation is inappropriate. This argument will 
be further substantiated in the last section. The final section 
lays out the five primary reasons supporting the thesis that 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is incompatible with Aristo-
tle’s political philosophy. 
The thesis of this paper faces a severe methodical prob-
lem. In order to convincingly criticize Nussbaum’s interpreta-
tion of Aristotle’s political philosophy, this paper has to claim 
a more adequate interpretation as a reference point. There-
fore, in order to support the arguments that will be given, 
the paper will also reference some contemporary literature on 
Aristotle’s Politics, which contains more adequate interpreta-
tions than the ones Nussbaum offers.
10 M. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership, Cambridge-London, Harvard University Press, 2006, p. 281, 
cf. p. 74; M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 225. Richard 
Arneson gives the criticism that such a suitable «threshold level» can only 
be fixed in an arbitrary way (R.J. Arneson, Perfectionism and Politics, «Eth-
ics», CXI, 2000, pp. 37-63: p. 56).
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Since Werner Jaeger’s famous book on Aristotle from 1923, 
which claims a development of his thought over his lifetime, 
Classicists have been debating whether Aristotle’s Politics can 
be understood as a unified work, or as a composition of an 
earlier and a later treatise, or as a collection of political es-
says that were written in different periods of his life11. This 
debate is not only of interest for Classicists, but for philoso-
phers as well. If the Politics were actually a collection of es-
says from different stages, it would be problematic to com-
bine Aristotle’s statements from different books in order to 
talk about the political philosophy of Aristotle. The same 
conclusion follows from the distinction of four different tasks 
of constitutional theory, which Aristotle makes at the begin-
ning of book IV of the Politics12. Unfortunately, Nussbaum 
doesn’t give these difficult and important problems the atten-
tion that they deserve, for in her interpretations she careless-
ly combines statements from all eight books of the Politics.
1. Human nature as the basis of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach
Like Aristotle, Nussbaum is convinced that an answer to 
the question of a good life can be achieved by reflecting on 
human nature. Similarly, she bases her theory of the good on 
specific human characteristics13. But opposed to interpret-
ers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams, Nuss-
11 W. Jaeger, Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwick-
lung, 2. revised ed., Berlin, Weidmann, 1955. For an overview of the con-
troversy between a genetic-analytic and a Unitarian view of the Politics see 
E. Schütrumpf, Die Analyse der Polis durch Aristoteles, Amsterdam, Grüner, 
1980, pp. 287-326, and Ch. Rowe, Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s �Politics», 
in A Companion to Aristotle’s �Politics», ed. by D. Keyt and F.D. Miller 
Jr., Oxford-Cambridge, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 57-74. For the current debate 
see M. Knoll, Die �Politik» des Aristoteles – eine unitarische Interpretation, 
«Zeitschrift für Politik», LVIII, 2011, pp. 123-47; M. Knoll, Die �Politik» 
des Aristoteles – Aufsatzsammlung oder einheitliches Werk? Replik auf Eckart 
Schütrumps Erwiderung, «Zeitschrift für Politik», LVIII, 2011, pp. 410-23.
12 Cf. M. Knoll, Die Verfassungslehre des Aristoteles, in Die �Politik» 
des Aristoteles, ed. by B. Zehnpfennig, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012, pp. 
124-42: pp. 133-35.
13 For a critique of Nussbaum’s normative endeavor to derive an out-
line of the good life from the common human nature see L.M. Antony, 
Natures and Norms, «Ethics», CXI, 2000, pp. 8-36.
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baum claims that Aristotle’s conception of human nature is 
not metaphysical14. Though she defends an objective theory 
of the good and an Aristotelian essentialism, she makes it 
clear that her capabilities approach should not be understood 
as metaphysical. Rather, she views it as an internal essential-
ism closely related to the position Hilary Putnam advocates. 
About her essentialist conception of the human being, Nuss-
baum states: «This conception is emphatically not metaphysi-
cal; that is, it does not claim to derive from any source ex-
ternal to the actual self-interpretations and self-evaluations of 
human beings in history»15.
According to Alasdair MacIntyre’s interpretation, Aristo-
tle’s Ethics «presupposes his metaphysical biology»16. In line 
with this, Bernard Williams maintains that Aristotle under-
stands questions «about essential human nature» as «matters 
of natural scientific fact, not of ethical value»17. He criticizes 
Aristotle for deriving ethical norms from a scientific account 
of human nature. For Williams, such an account is not avail-
able, and if it were, it would not allow ethical conclusions. 
Against these interpretations, Nussbaum tries to show that 
Aristotle does not give a scientific account of human nature 
or an account that is external to human self-interpretations 
and self-evaluations. She claims that Aristotle’s concept of 
the human being is, like her own, an internal and «evalua-
tive concept» that evaluates the elements and activities of life 
which are most important for human existence18.
14 M. Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of 
Ethics, in World, Mind, and Ethics. Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard 
Williams, ed. by J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison, Cambridge-New York-Mel-
bourne, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 86-131. Cf. a critique of this 
claim: M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder demokratische Gerechtigkeit?, cit., ch. X.
15 M. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of 
Aristotelian Essentialism, «Political Theory», XX, 1992, pp. 202-46: p. 215.
16 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame (IN), Notre Dame Univer-
sity Press, 1984, p. 148.
17 This paraphrase of William’s position is given by M. Nussbaum, Ar-
istotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics, cit., p. 88. Cf. B. 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge (MA), Harvard 
University Press, 1985. 
18 M. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities, cit., pp. 
118-19; M. Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of 
Ethics, cit., p. 94.
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Nussbaum’s interpretation is original but not convincing. 
In her essays she merely lays out her own interpretation and 
neglects any refutation of the reasons that substantiate the 
traditional interpretation of Aristotle. To give an important 
example, she is completely silent about the fact that Aristo-
tle’s definition of the human being as «by nature a political 
animal (physei politikon zôon)» in the Politics refers to the 
biological definition of the concept of the political that he 
gives in his History of Animals19. Contrary to Nussbaum, the 
contemporary literature diagnoses in Aristotle a «biologically 
based understanding of “political animal”»20. Aristotle un-
derstands the human being from a zoological and political as 
well as from a teleological perspective21. Hence, MacIntyre’s 
term «metaphysical biology» is adequate to characterize Aris-
totle’s concept of the human being22. 
In her early work on the capabilities approach, Nussbaum 
drew up a list consisting of «certain features of our common 
humanity»23. But contrary to her methodological self-under-
standing, this list is based neither «on the commonness of 
myths and stories from many times and places» nor on «the 
outcome of a process of self-interpretation and self-clarifi-
cation» of human beings explaining to themselves who they 
are24. On the contrary, Nussbaum gains her list through an 
original interpretation of how Aristotle introduces his cata-
logue of virtues. According to this interpretation, Aristotle 
identifies universal human experiences and correlates these 
with specific virtues. As a first step, Aristotle defines a virtue 
as the right behaviour in one area of experience. For example, 
everyone experiences the fear of death and significant harm; 
19 Aristotle, Politics, I. 2, 1253 a 1-18; Aristotle, History of Animals, I. 
1, 488 a 7-10.
20 F.D. Miller Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s �Politics», 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 31-32. 
21 Cf. the teleological perspective in Aristotle, Politics, I. 2, 1252 b 31-
1253 a 1, 1253 a 9, and in Aristotle’s «human function argument» in Aris-
totle, Nicomachean Ethics, I. 6/7, 1097 b 22-1098 a 20.
22 For more arguments against Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aris-
totle’s concept of the human being see M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder 
demokratische Gerechtigkeit?, cit., ch. X.
23 M. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach 
(1988), in The Quality of Life, cit., pp. 242-69: p. 263.
24 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., pp. 217-18. 
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the «virtue bravery» is subsequently introduced as the name 
that characterizes the right behaviour if one is confronted 
with these fears. In a second step, which is irrelevant to the 
methodical procedure Nussbaum uses to build her list, Aris-
totle gives a more precise definition of the particular virtue.
Nussbaum’s first list of common human characteristics is, 
as she declares, «closely related to Aristotle’s list of common 
experiences»; and in fact, her list is based on the universal 
human experiences singled out by Aristotle25. Based on her 
list of specific human features, Nussbaum proceeds to pro-
pose an open-ended list of basic human functional capabilities 
that «provides a minimal theory of the good»26. In order to 
realize this objective conception of the good and to develop 
all capabilities on the list, ample resources and a strong wel-
fare state would be needed27. However, governments should 
limit their efforts to the development of capabilities only, as 
citizens should be free to decide which of the corresponding 
functions they would like to realize and which not28.
2. Nussbaum’s egalitarian interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine 
of distributive justice
Nussbaum distinguishes between three levels of capabili-
ties that are based on each other. The lowest and most fun-
damental level, which is a necessary presupposition for the 
development of the higher levels, is the level of basic capa-
bilities. A basic capability is a capability given by nature or 
a natural disposition to reach the next capability level and to 
perform the corresponding functions. A person has a basic 
capability if her individual constitution allows her, after an 
appropriate education and time, and other necessary condi-
tions, to perform the corresponding functions. While basic 
capabilities are given by nature, internal capabilities are only 
developed by young women and men through education. A 
25 M. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, cit., 
p. 265 (cf. p. 263).
26 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 225.
27 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 228.
28 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 214.
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person has an internal capability if her intellect, character or 
body is developed in such a way that she is able to decide 
under the appropriate circumstances to perform the corre-
sponding functions. The third level is the level of external, 
or better, combined capabilities. Combined capabilities are in-
ternal capabilities plus external material and social conditions 
that are necessary in order to be able to decide to perform a 
function in the first place29. 
In the context of her distinction of three levels of capabil-
ities, Nussbaum explains the normative dimension of her ca-
pabilities approach. A central part of her «capability ethic»30 
is a conception of justice that links up with Aristotle’s doc-
trine of distributive justice. According to the central thought 
of Nussbaum’s conception of justice, a just political distribu-
tion has to allot the material conditions to perform a func-
tion to those citizens who possess the capabilities to perform 
this function. Nussbaum illustrates her conception of justice 
with Aristotle’s example of a just distribution of flutes31. In 
such a distribution neither noble descent nor beauty are rel-
evant criteria for claims to a flute. Rather, it is the capabil-
ity to play the flute that gives one a claim. Analogously, in 
the distribution of political offices, Aristotle regards neither 
noble descent nor wealth as justified reasons for claims, but 
only the capability to perform the functions that are connect-
ed to the office. According to Nussbaum, Aristotle uses the 
example of a just distribution of flutes «to make a more gen-
eral point: that capability is the morally relevant criterion for 
distribution of the conditions for a function, since capability, 
unlike other features, has relevance to the performance of the 
function»32. 
29 M. Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability, cit., ch. 5; M. Nuss-
baum, Creating Capabilities, cit., pp. 21-22. 
30 The term «capability ethic» was used by David Crocker to char-
acterize the related works of Amatya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (D.A. 
Crocker, Functioning and Capabilities: The Foundations of Sen’s and Nuss-
baum’s Development Ethics, «Political Theory», XX, 1992, pp. 584-612: p. 
585).
31 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, III. 12, 1282 b 14-1283 a 26. 
32 M. Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Politi-
cal Distribution, cit., p. 171.
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The justified reasons for claims in a distribution of flutes 
or political offices, which Aristotle has in mind, are inter-
nal capabilities, that is, already developed basic capabilities. 
Nussbaum is aware of that. However, contrary to Aristotle, 
she anchors the normative dimension of her capabilities ap-
proach at the level of the basic capabilities, which are the 
natural basis for developing the internal capabilities and for 
performing the corresponding functions. According to her 
central normative thought, the basic capabilities 
are needs for functioning: they give rise to a claim because they are there and 
in a state of incomplete realization. They are conditions that reach towards, 
demand fulfilment in, a certain mode of activity. If the activity never arrives, 
they are cut off, fruitless, incomplete. As Aristotle insists, their very being 
makes reference to functioning; so without the possibility of functioning, they 
are only in a shadow way even themselves33. 
This paragraph shows that Nussbaum achieves the ethi-
cal or normative centre of her capabilities approach not only 
by linking up with Aristotle’s doctrine of distributive justice, 
but by appropriating his claim that natural objects that exist 
in the mode of dunamis strive toward their energeia, to the 
actualization or realization of their potentiality. In the end, 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach derives from the existence 
of potentialities the moral and ultimately political claim that 
these potentialities should be realized. This derivation evokes 
the critique that Nussbaum commits a naturalistic fallacy. In 
all likelihood, Nussbaum would reject this critique by claim-
ing that her statements about human potentials and basic ca-
pabilities are not external statements about natural facts but 
evaluative statements and internal interpretations34. However, 
Nussbaum’s appropriation of Aristotle’s thought that human 
potentials strive towards their actualization is not unprob-
lematic. This thought is connected with Aristotle’s teleologi-
cal conception of nature and with his «metaphysical biology», 
which calls Nussbaum’s claim, that her ethical and political 
conception is not metaphysical, into question. 
33 M. Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Politi-
cal Distribution, cit., p. 172.
34 Cf. M. Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations 
of Ethics, cit.; M. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, cit., p. 28.
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Nussbaum’s «capability ethic» adopts Aristotle’s doctrine 
of distributive justice and modifies it in two respects. First, 
she rephrases his doctrine in terms of capabilities and func-
tionings. Second, she extends his doctrine by relating it to 
the level of basic capabilities. On this level, distributive jus-
tice becomes especially relevant through its connection with 
the Aristotelian thought that human potentials strive towards 
their actualization and should be realized. The legislator has 
to promote the development of human potentials by distrib-
uting to people, who have a basic capability, as many relevant 
goods as are needed to bring them along to a combined ca-
pability – «just as we set the flute-player up with the condi-
tions of flute playing»35. For Aristotle, it is unjust if the leg-
islator does not allot the flutes or the political offices to play-
ers or citizens, whose realized capabilities give them a justi-
fied claim. Analogously, according to Nussbaum, all citizens 
with basic capabilities have a justified claim that the legislator 
distributes the resources of the political community in a way 
that they can develop their capabilities. For her, «it is unjust 
of the legislator not to give these essential goods to all those 
who are by nature capable of using them»36. Modifying Ar-
istotle’s doctrine, Nussbaum declares that when it comes to 
the political distribution of resources neither birth, wealth, or 
good looks constitute a justified claim, but the presence of a 
basic capability «to perform the function in question» does 
constitute a claim37. 
Nussbaum interprets Aristotle’s doctrine of distributive jus-
tice in an egalitarian way. In order to see that such an egali-
tarian interpretation is inappropriate, it is sufficient to point 
out the fact that Aristotle maintains that people are funda-
mentally unequal and have unequal worth. For him, only a 
few people have the capability to play the flute well or to 
exercise an important political office. The former activity re-
quires musical talent, the latter special moral and intellectual 
qualities and thus a degree of political virtue that only a few 
people can achieve. The capabilities, in proportion to which 
35 M. Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Politi-
cal Distribution, cit., p. 171.
36 Ibidem.
37 Ibidem.
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the political goods should be distributed for Aristotle, dif-
fer from those of Nussbaum’s capabilities list in the respect 
that only a few people have them. On the contrary, a look at 
Nussbaum’s lists elucidates that most people have the capa-
bility of being able to live a full life without pain, or to have 
good health.
3. The incompatibility of Nussbaum’s and Aristotle’s political 
philosophies 
There are five primary reasons why Nussbaum’s capabili-
ties approach is incompatible with Aristotle’s political phi-
losophy. First, contrary to Nussbaum, for Aristotle there is 
no «common humanity»38, because for him human beings 
are fundamentally unequal39. According to Aristotle, natural 
slaves, barbarians and women have different capabilities than 
those free men who have the potential to fully develop the 
virtues of their character and intellect. In addition, he claims 
that the majority of the people like farmers, craftsmen and 
traders cannot develop the virtues needed for a good life as 
they have to work40. Aristotle’s and Nussbaum’s very different 
views of the equality or inequality of human beings are the 
anthropological basis and reason for the serious differences 
of their conceptions of political justice and their political phi-
losophy in general. For Nussbaum, as for all egalitarian polit-
ical thinkers, «at some very basic level all human beings have 
equal worth and importance, and are therefore equally wor-
thy of concern and respect»41. Contrary to this, for Aristotle, 
as for Plato, human beings have unequal worth in proportion 
38 M. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues, cit., p. 263; M. Nussbaum, Hu-
man Functioning and Social Justice, cit., pp. 237, 239.
39 Cf. M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder demokratische Gerechtigkeit?, cit., 
ch. VI.1.
40 Aristotle, Politics, III. 5, VII. 9; 1277 b 33-1278 b 5, 1328 b 39-
1329 b 39. Nussbaum is aware of Aristotle’s views of women and slaves by 
nature (M. Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of 
Ethics, cit.; Id., Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities, cit., p. 114; Id., 
Nature, Function, and Capability, cit., pp. 174-75). 
41 J. Baker – S. Cantillon – K. Lynch – J. Walsh, Equality. From Theo-
ry to Action, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2004, p. 23.
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to the development of the virtues of their character and their 
intellect. 
Second, Nussbaum’s conception of justice is egalitarian as 
it aims at the political bringing about of equal capabilities 
for a good life in the numeric sense. Her conception is con-
cerned not only with the citizen’s claim to «good function-
ing but the equal distribution of good functioning»42. This 
is her answer in the contemporary debate on the «equality 
of what?» that revolves around the question which kind of 
equality – equality of resources, of welfare etc. – should be 
politically established43. Nussbaum’s egalitarian and demo-
cratic conception of distributive justice is incompatible with 
Aristotle’s aristocratic conception which advocates geomet-
ric equality in proportion to virtue and thus unequal shares 
for fundamentally unequal human beings44. The objective of 
Nussbaum’s egalitarian conception of justice to establish nu-
merical or arithmetic equality among the people is alien to 
Aristotle’s non-egalitarian conception, which calls for a dis-
tribution that corresponds to the existing inequalities. Aristo-
tle and Nussbaum adhere to two irreconcilable conceptions 
of social and political justice, which coexist from the ancient 
world till today. The existence of such a pluralism of the just 
has convincingly been demonstrated by Dagmar Herwig in 
her systematic analysis of the concept of justice45. 
Aristotle’s and Nussbaum’s opposing views of the equality 
or inequality of human beings are the basis of a third reason 
why Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is incompatible with 
Aristotle’s ethical and political conception. Nussbaum claims 
that the «Aristotelian conception» is «broad» as «it is con-
cerned with the good living not of an elite few, but of each 
42 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 231 (M. Knoll’s 
italics).
43 A. Sen, Inequality Reexamined, cit., p. 4. Cf. G.A. Cohen, On the 
Currency of Egalitarian Justice, «Ethics», IC, 1989, pp. 906-44.
44 Cf. an analysis of Aristotle’s aristocratic conception of distributive 
justice M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder demokratische Gerechtigkeit?, cit., ch. 
VI.2.
45 D. Herwig, Gleichbehandlung und Egalisierung als konkurrieren-
de Modelle von Gerechtigkeit. Eine systematische Analyse, München, Fink, 
1984. Cf. attempts to build on Herwig’s results and to apply them to the 
debates in contemporary political philosophy M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder 
demokratische Gerechtigkeit?, cit., ch. XV. 
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and every member of the polity. It aims to bring every mem-
ber across a threshold into conditions and circumstances in 
which a good human life may be chosen and lived»46. With 
regard to Nussbaum’s lists of human capabilities and thus 
to her theory of the good this claim is plausible. Everyone 
is more or less «able to live to the end of a complete hu-
man life, as far as it is possible», «to have good health», to 
«have pleasurable experiences» or «to use the five senses»47. 
But this conception of a good life is not the one outlined 
by Aristotle. According to his practical philosophy, only the 
few free men who are able to fully develop the virtues of 
their character and intellect and to exercise them in a politi-
cal or theoretical life can achieve true happiness48. Aristotle’s 
conception of happiness is by far more demanding and elit-
ist than the one Nussbaum advocates, because for the life of 
contemplation one needs wisdom, and for the political life 
prudence and ethical virtues like temperance, bravery and 
justice. This also entails that Nussbaum’s conception of the 
good life cannot claim to be Aristotelian.
Connected to Nussbaum’s and Aristotle’s different concep-
tion of a good life is a very different evaluation of work, that 
leads to the forth point. According to Nussbaum, the Aris-
totelian conception calls especially «for the construction of 
fully human and sociable forms of labor for all citizens»49. 
Nussbaum is right with her observation that for Aristotle 
«some forms of labor are incompatible with good human 
functioning»50. But this doesn’t only concern, as Nussbaum 
holds, the activities of the farmers and the craftsmen who 
are excluded from citizenship in the best city that Aristotle 
drafts in books VII and VIII of the Politics. It also concerns 
all business activities and in the end all forms of useful and 
necessary labor. Contrary to Nussbaum, Aristotle has a very 
low esteem of all kinds of work and of the people who have 
to do it. For him a good life and the full development of all 
46 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 209.
47 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 225.
48 Cf. J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, London, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1975.
49 M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, cit., p. 231.
50 Ibidem.
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the different virtues require leisure and free time as its pre-
condition51.
And finally, the fifth point, Nussbaum claims that Aristotle 
advocates a Social Democracy and thus favors a kind of dem-
ocratic constitution he calls polity (politeia)52. Contrary to her 
interpretation, the best city Aristotle drafts in books VII and 
VIII of the Politics must be understood as a true aristocracy 
in which only the elite of the few free men who are able to 
fully develop their virtues are citizens53. This exclusive crite-
rion for citizenship is the consequence of Aristotle defining 
the best city as the city in which the citizens are able to lead 
the best and happiest life which requires the full develop-
ment of the human virtues. The polity cannot be understood 
as Aristotle’s best city. He declares more than once that the 
citizens of the polity, average Greek men, are far from be-
ing fully virtuous. As a consequence, they do not possess the 
qualities which are required for citizenship in the best city54. 
The anthropological basis of Aristotle’s best city is the fun-
damental inequality of human beings and their capabilities 
to live a truly good and happy life. This is another argument 
demonstrating that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is in-
compatible with Aristotle’s conception of political justice and 
with his political philosophy in general. Combined, these five 
related reasons demonstrate that Nussbaum’s «Aristotelian 
Social Democracy» and her capabilities approach can hardly 
be called Aristotelian. Despite these criticisms, it is undeni-
ably an interesting and important approach to contemporary 
political philosophy.
51 Cf. M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder demokratische Gerechtigkeit?, cit., 
pp. 256-58. Cf. Nussbaum’s critique of Aristotle’s concept of leisure (M. 
Nussbaum, Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities, cit., pp. 112-13). 
52 Aristotle, Politics, III. 7, 1279 a 39; M. Nussbaum, Aristotelian So-
cial Democracy, cit., pp. 232-33; M. Nussbaum, Love, Literature, and Hu-
man Universals: Comments on the Papers, in Martha C. Nussbaum, Ethics 
and Political Philosophy, Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 2000, ed. by 
A. Kallhoff, Münster, Lit. Verlag, 2001, pp. 129-52: p. 147. 
53 The interpretation that Aristotle’s best city has to be understood as 
an aristocracy is prevailing in the English speaking literature (cf. A Com-
panion to Aristotle’s Politics, cit.).
54 Aristotle, Politics, III. 7, IV. 11, 1279 a 39-1279 b 4, 1295 a 25-31. 
Cf. E. Schütrumpf, Die Analyse der Polis durch Aristoteles, cit., p. 159.
Nussbaum’s �Aristotelian Social Democracy» 221
Summary. How Aristotelian is Martha Nussbaum’s �Aristotelian So-
cial Democracy»?
The paper examines Martha Nussbaum’s «Aristotelian Social De-
mocracy», and in particular her appropriation of Aristotle’s politi-
cal philosophy. The paper questions Nussbaum’s claim that Aristo-
tle’s account of human nature and her capabilities approach are not 
metaphysical. It critically analyses Nussbaum’s egalitarian interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s doctrine of distributive justice, laying out the 
primary reasons supporting the thesis that Nussbaum’s «Aristotelian 
Social Democracy» is incompatible with Aristotle’s non-egalitarian 
political philosophy.
Keywords: Capabilities Approach, Human Nature, Good Life, Dis-
tributive Justice, Equality.
Riassunto. Quanto è aristotelica la �democrazia sociale aristotelica» di 
Martha Nussbaum? 
L’articolo esamina la «democrazia sociale aristotelica» di Martha 
Nussbaum, in particolare l’uso che in essa si fa della filosofia politi-
ca di Aristotele. L’articolo discute la tesi di Nussbaum secondo cui 
Aristotele non aveva una concezione metafisica della natura umana 
e del suo approccio delle capacità. Affronta inoltre in maniera criti-
ca l’interpretazione egalitaria della dottrina della giustizia distributi-
va di Aristotele avanzata da Nussbaum, esponendo le ragioni prin-
cipali a sostegno della tesi che la «democrazia sociale aristotelica» 
di Martha Nussbaum è incompatibile con la filosofia politica non-
egalitaria di Aristotele.

